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We test whether a demand response by patients exists in the Norwe-
gian primary care sector. In Norway, physicians are remunerated either
by salary or by incentive contract, and we have access to a large data
survey that allows us to study the relationship between consumer satis-
faction with primary physician services and the way physicians are paid.
In addition, we can identify areas (municipalities) where market demand
for primary physicians’ services is responsive to eﬀort. When a demand
response exists, we expect that patients’ beneﬁt is higher and that pa-
tients are more satisﬁed when visiting a contract physician. As expected,
we ﬁnd very small eﬀects of the salary physician density on reported pa-
tient satisfaction in municipalities where market demand is nonresponsive
to physicians’ choice of eﬀort. In municipalities with responsive market
demand, we ﬁnd a negative association between salary physician density
and patients’ satisfaction with their physician.
JEL classiﬁcation: I11; M52
Keywords: Physician behavior; Remuneration contracts; Patients’ satis-
faction
21I n t r o d u c t i o n
When patients visit a primary care physician, their beneﬁt from treatment de-
pends on the care or eﬀort that the physician puts into the production of health
for them. Following Wedig et al. (1989), we interpret eﬀort as any costly activ-
ity that aﬀects patients’ valuation of the services they receive, including dimen-
sions of convenience, comfort, communication about medical conditions, as well
as some narrowly deﬁned “clinical” quality of care. In the payer’s (government’s
or insurance company’s) view, the physician’s eﬀort may also be valuable since
patients’ behavior is aﬀected by how satisﬁed they are with their physician.
Kalda et al. (2003) show that satisﬁed patients are more likely to continue their
physician relationship, and Berkanovic and Marcus (1976) show that satisﬁed
patients are less inclined to abort their treatment programs. Studies have also
shown that patients’ satisfaction is positively correlated with objective measures
of quality, like average consultation time and use of preventive care in primary
care (Scott et al. 1995, Kalda et al. 2003).
It is, however, not straightforward for the payer to provide incentives such
that physicians are willing to increase the intensity (or quality) of treatments,
since these inputs are often nonveriﬁable and thus cannot be used as a basis for
payments. If a physician should be willing to exert (costly) eﬀort, there must be
an indirect way of rewarding him/her. One such mechanism may exist if (i) eﬀort
is important to patients, and (ii) if patients observe a signal of the physician’s
choice of eﬀort before choosing their primary care physician so physicians who
exert higher levels of eﬀort attract more patients. If in addition (iii) physicians’
3income depends on the number of patients seen and (iv) patients can choose
among diﬀerent physicians, there exist incentives for physicians to exert costly
eﬀort. From the arguments above, it follows that two sets of conditions must
be fulﬁlled if physicians are to be willing to exert costly eﬀort. First, patients
must prefer physicians who exert high eﬀort; and second, the payment regime
and the market condition must be such that physicians lose income by exerting
low eﬀort.
The idea that patients respond to the treatment they are oﬀered by choosing
where or whether to be treated has been identiﬁed as an important incentive
instrument for increasing the quality of care. Ma and McGuire (1997) and
McGuire (2000) model how payments based on the number of patients treated
can be used to provide appropriate incentives. They argue that if physicians
have long-term relationships with their patients, or if physicians invest in quality
to increase or maintain their reputation, a demand response by patients exists,
and physicians have incentives to exert high eﬀort.
Many empirical studies have conﬁrmed the eﬀe c to ff o r mo fp a y m e n to n
physician behavior1, but these studies typically show how physicians’ quantity
decisions depend on the payment system. We do not know of any studies that
test empirically whether a potential demand response by patients may induce
physicians to exert costly eﬀo r tt h a ti n c r e a s e st h equality o fc a r e . T h i si st h e
purpose of the current paper.
The Norwegian case oﬀers a unique opportunity to explore this issue. First,
1McGuire (2000, p. 491-2) provides an overview of some of these studies.
4primary care physicians are remunerated in two diﬀerent ways, either by salary
or by an incentive contract. Salaried physicians receive a ﬁxed salary. Contract
physicians’ income consists of a ﬁxed grant, patient fee per visit and revenue
from the National Insurance Administration from provision of items of medical
treatment. Their income is thus dependent on the number of patients seen.
Since the salaried physicians’ income is independent of the number of patients
seen, only contract physicians have incentives to exert eﬀort if a demand re-
sponse exists. Second, we have access to a large data survey that allows us to
study the relationship between consumer satisfaction with primary physician
services and the way physicians are paid. Figure 1 summarizes market condi-
tions and remuneration schemes and physicians’ incentives to exert costly eﬀort.
S i n c ew ee x p e c tt h a tp a t i e n t s ’b e n e ﬁt is higher the more eﬀort the physician
puts into the production of health for the patient, we infer that patients who
visit a contract physician are more satisﬁed.
[Figure 1 about here]
A possible problem is that such a relationship might be exaggerated by a
selection eﬀect. Contract physicians might, for example, have a lower marginal
valuation of leisure, so they are willing to work longer hours compared with
salaried physicians. We are, however, able to correct for selection eﬀects by us-
ing the fact that a demand response only exists in areas (municipalities) where
the market demand for primary care services is responsive to eﬀort.2 That is, we
2The argument is simply that there is no need to exert costly eﬀort in markets where
market demand is nonresponsive to physicians’ choice of eﬀort.
5do not expect patients’ satisfaction to depend on how their physician is remu-
n e r a t e di na r e a sw h e r em a r k e td e m a n di si n e l a s t i c .S i n c ew ec a ni d e n t i f ya r e a s
(municipalities) with responsive and nonresponsive market demand for primary
physicians services, we have all the ingredients needed to test our hypothesis:
contract physicians are exerting more eﬀort in areas where market demand for
primary physicians’ services is responsive to eﬀort.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we outline a model of contract
physicians’ choice of quantity and eﬀort. Section 3 includes a short description
of the Norwegian primary care sector, while section 4 presents data and the
empirical models. The results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we outline a model of contract physicians’ choice of quantity and
eﬀort. It is a simpliﬁed version of the model in Ma and McGuire (1997), see
also McGuire (2000).
Consider a contract physician who is providing two diﬀerent types of inputs
into the production of health for the patient. Let the term “quantity” denote
those physician inputs that are veriﬁable, so monetary remuneration can be
provided. Examples of veriﬁable inputs are diagnostic tests, prescriptions, etc.
The other type of inputs we denote as eﬀort. These inputs increase the intensity
or quality of treatment but are nonveriﬁable. From the patient’s point of view,
6both types of input aﬀect the beneﬁts of receiving health care.
Let B(e,x) denote the (gross) beneﬁt (in monetary terms) of receiving treat-
ment x when the physician exerts eﬀort 0 ≤ e ≤ e ≤ e,w h e r ee is the maximum
level of eﬀort the physician can exert (e.g., because of time capacity). e is the
level of eﬀort that the physician will provide in the absence of any ﬁnancial
reward for exerting eﬀort. For simplicity, we assume e =0 .L e t Bi > 0 and
Bii < 0,i= e,x denote the ﬁrst and second derivatives of B(e,x), so the bene-
ﬁt of receiving treatment is increasing in both arguments at a decreasing rate.
The patient’s copayment per unit of treatment x is pd ≥ 0.T h i sc o p a y m e n ti s
determined by the payer and is paid directly to the physician. The patient’s net
beneﬁto ft r e a t m e n ti sNB(e,x,pd)=B(e,x) − pdx.
The physician is risk neutral and has a utility function that is separable into
money and eﬀort. The physician’s reservation utility is normalized to zero. The
physician’s cost per unit of treatment of exerting eﬀort is c(e),w h e r ec(·) is
strictly convex with ce =0 ,a n dce =+ ∞. The payer oﬀers a (fee-for-service)
contract to the physician that speciﬁes the price ps > 0 per unit of treatment x.
To capture the fact that contract physicians do not receive capitation payments,
we assume ps+pd ≥ c(e) ∀e ∈ [e,e e], where e e<e. From this, it follows that proﬁt
per patient is (ps +pd −c(e))x and that proﬁt per patient is nonnegative for all
e ∈ [e,e e], where e e<e. In addition, contract physicians receive a ﬁxed payment
R ≥ 0 to cover some of their (ﬁxed) expenses (auxiliary personnel etc.).
Since eﬀort is not contractible and eﬀort (above e) is costly (ce > 0, ∀e>e ),
contract physicians will exert eﬀort only if higher eﬀort attracts more patients.
7Such a demand response will exist if potential patients get information from
friends about their valuation of the eﬀort a physician has provided to other
patients, and if they are using this information to form beliefs that they will
receive the same quality. These beliefs are correct if physicians are interested
in maintaining their reputation. Hence, by changing their eﬀort levels, physi-
cians change the information available to potential customers, and this creates
a demand response. We do not model this reputation eﬀect formally but sim-
ply assume that the number of patients n ≥ 0 the physician serves depends
positively on the beneﬁto ﬀered; n = n(NB), with n0(NB) > 0.3
Physicians choose eﬀort e and the level of treatment x that maximizes their
proﬁt π, where (for simplicity R =0 ) :
π = n(NB)[(ps + pd − c(e))x].
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:4
πe : n0Be(ps + pd − c)x − ncex =0 ,
πx : n0(Bx − pd)(ps + pd − c)x + n(ps + pd − c)=0 .
3Ma and McGuire (1997) contains a more extensive discussion of diﬀerent types of demand
response.
4The regularity conditions put on the cost and the beneﬁt functions ensure that the second-
order conditions are satisﬁed.























Equation (1) describes a physician’s choice of x. It shows that the net beneﬁt
elasticity of treatment, εx,NB, is equal to the negative inverse of the demand
response of quantity: the change in the number of patients treated with respect
to a change in the beneﬁt provided. Since the RHS of (1) is negative, Bx−pd <
0, and we obtain the well-known result that fee-for-service payments give the
physician incentives to push the quantity of treatment beyond the point the
patient would prefer. The physician is, however, restrained by market demand.
If, for example, market demand becomes more responsive (i.e., the demand
response elasticity of quantity increases so the LHS becomes a smaller negative
number), the physician must respond by reducing x (and thus increasing Bx) to
retain LHS = RHS.
From equation (2), it follows that the physician trades oﬀ the average fee
over cost to the ratio of two elasticities when determining the optimal choice of
eﬀort.5 The cost elasticity of eﬀort (εc,e) and the demand response elasticity
(εn,e). First, we note that the payer can induce more eﬀort by paying more
for services. To see this, note that the RHS is increasing in e since Bee < 0
and cee > 0. More importantly, the physician’s choice of eﬀort is higher the
5Since eﬀort cannot be rewarded directly, the physician takes average proﬁtability into
account when determining eﬀort.
9more responsive market demand is to eﬀort. To see this, note that the RHS is
decreasing in n0, and eﬀort has to increase to maintain optimality. This is the
empirical implication we will test in the next sections of the paper.
3 The Norwegian Primary Care Sector
In Norway, primary care is the responsibility of the municipalities, which consti-
tute the lowest level of government. Municipalities are required by law to oﬀer
services for disease prevention and health promotion, diagnosis and treatment
of illness, rehabilitation, and long-term care. There are no deﬁned minimum
standards (e.g., physician—patient ratios) regarding level or quality of health
services. The primary health care sector is ﬁnanced through grants from mu-
nicipalities, fee-for-service reimbursement from the National Insurance Scheme
(NIS) for services supplied, and out-of-pocket payments by patients.
Two main groups of physicians provide primary health services: physicians
employed by the municipality, and self-employed physicians contracted to the
municipality. Both employed and contract physicians work separately from hos-
pital services and provide the ﬁrst contact between patients and health services.
Salaried physicians’ income is independent of the number of patients, and their
working hours and tasks are generally determined by the municipality. They
have, however, the possibility of part-time posts and overtime. Contract physi-
cians have a contract with the municipality to cover some expenses (about 30
per cent of physicians’ gross income, (Statistics Norway, 1996). As well, they
10obtain income from patient fees and a ﬁxed fee reimbursement scheme from the
National Insurance Administration. Patients pay a ﬁxed fee per consultation,
and these fees contribute about 30% of contract physicians’ gross income (Statis-
tics Norway, 1996). The payment for provision of treatment from the National
Insurance Administration contributed about 40% of the contract physicians’
gross income (Statistics Norway, 1996). Apart from contracted minimum open-
ing hours, contract physicians can make their own decision about the number
of hours worked.
4 Data and Empirical Models
The data for the empirical analysis are taken from a large data survey collected
by the Norwegian Gallup Institute (TNS Gallup) in 1998. In this survey, a
random sample of respondents is asked to rank their satisfaction with various
aspects of the primary physician services in their municipality. 24 764 respon-
dents (out of a total of 50 433) returned the questionnaire. The survey contains
information about respondents and their families. To get information on mu-
nicipal characteristics, we use data from the Norwegian Social Science Data
Services (NSD). This data source contains statistics for all municipal units of
administration in Norway including variables describing supply of physicians
and other health services, hospitalization and mortality rates.
In our analysis, we exclude all respondents (6506) living in municipalities
11classiﬁed as least central by Statistics Norway.6 Rural municipalities are char-
acterized by high turnover and vacancy rates, and they typically use ﬁxed salary
contracts as a means to recruit and retain physicians (Carlsen and Grytten,
2000). We have no information on physician turnover in our data, and the
number of employed physicians may therefore pick up the impact of turnover
on patients’ user satisfaction in our analysis. Furthermore, in rural municipali-
ties, patients’ choice of physicians is quite limited because of the few physicians.
As our main objective is to isolate the incentive eﬀects of diﬀerent payment
schemes, we exclude rural municipalities from the sample. We further restrict
our sample to respondents who visited a physician during the last 12 months.
After dropping respondents with missing information on individual or munici-
pality characteristics, our ﬁnal sample contains 15 920 individuals.
An important implication of the theoretical model is that the more respon-
sive market demand is to eﬀort, the higher a contract physician’s choice of eﬀort
is. The reason is simply that the beneﬁt of maintaining a good reputation is
higher when the cost of losing patients (and thus income) is greater. There is no
way we can observe the market condition directly, and thus we need to approx-
imate the market responsiveness to eﬀort. We infer that patients’ demand is
more responsive when the physicians are competing for patients. Some studies
(e.g., Grytten and Sørensen, 2001) use physician density (physicians per capita)
as a measure of competition. However, high physician density might be the
result of a high demand or a sparsely populated area and does not necessarily
6This classiﬁcation is based on the municipality’s geographical position relative to the
nearest center with central functions, the number of inhabitants, etc.
12reﬂect patients’ opportunities to choose where to be treated. An alternative
measure of patients’ opportunities to choose where to be treated is the number
of vacant physician positions in a municipality. A vacant position is deﬁned as a
position that has been unoccupied for more than four months. We note that if
ap h y s i c i a ni sﬁlling a position on a temporary basis, the position is not deﬁned
as vacant. The number of vacant positions can thus be interpreted as a mea-
sure of how responsive market demand is to eﬀort. The hypothesis is that the
more vacant positions there are in a municipality, the more responsive market
demand is to eﬀort.
We deﬁne municipalities where market demand is responsive to eﬀort as
municipalities with the number of vacant physician positions higher than the
average vacancy level.
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here]
Variable descriptions are given in Table 1, and descriptive statistics for the
total sample and for municipalities with and without responsive market demand
are given in Table 2. Looking ﬁrst at the dependent variables, we notice that
patients are quite satisﬁed with their physicians. The respondents are asked to
rank their satisfaction on a scale from 1 (very dissatisﬁed) to 6 (very satisﬁed).
For general satisfaction, friendliness, professional skills,a n doutcome and infor-
mation, the average satisfaction rating varies between about 4.6 and 5. Patients
are less satisﬁed with their access to physician services. On questions regarding
waiting time and general access, the average satisfaction levels are 3.7 and 3.8,
13respectively. Comparing our two subsamples, we further notice that respon-
dents living in municipalities with nonresponsive market demand for physician
services are somewhat less satisﬁed than others.
As explanatory variables, we use both individual and municipality charac-
teristics. The former include age, gender, marital status, education and fam-
ily income. The municipality characteristics include three variables describing
the supply of physicians (physician density, wage physician density and junior
physician density). Supply of other health services may aﬀect the demand for
physician services, and to control for this, we include the number of other per-
sonnel in primary health care, total expenses in primary health care and whether
there is a hospital in the municipality. To control for diﬀerences in demand due
to diﬀerences in health status, we include mortality rates and hospitalization.
Lastly, to control for diﬀerences in accessibility to physician services, we include
population size as a variable.
To take account of the ordinal scaling of our dependent variables, we estimate
ordered probit models. As patients’ user satisfaction is expected to depend both
on individual characteristics and on municipality characteristics, a multilevel
framework seems appropriate. The ordered probit model is commonly presented
as a latent variable model. We deﬁne Y ∗ as a latent variable ranging from −∞








γkzkj + εj + uij. (3)
14In this speciﬁcation, xhij are H variables characterizing the patient (age, gen-
der, etc.), zkj are K variables characterizing the municipality where the patient
lives (number of physicians, mortality, etc.), εj is the unobservable municipal-
ity eﬀect, and uij is the unobservable individual eﬀe c t . W ea s s u m et h a tt h e




                  
                  
1 if −∞<Y∗
ij ≤ θ1
2 if θ1 <Y∗
ij ≤ θ2
3 if θ2 <Y∗
ij ≤ θ3
4 if θ3 <Y∗
ij ≤ θ4
5 if θ4 <Y∗
ij ≤ θ5
6 if θ5 <Y∗
ij ≤ +∞,
where θi,i=1 ,2,...,5 are the unknown cut-oﬀ points to be estimated together
with βh and γk.
The multilevel model is estimated using the gllamm command in Stata
(Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2001), via a Newton—Raphson algorithm with adaptive
Gaussian quadrature.
5R e s u l t s
Our main purpose is to analyze the eﬀect of two diﬀerent payment schemes on
physicians’ choice of eﬀort: fee-for-service and ﬁxed salary contracts. As we
showed in the theoretical section, physician’s choice of eﬀort is higher the more
15responsive market demand is to eﬀort. To isolate the incentive eﬀect from a pos-
sible selection eﬀect, we divide the sample into two subsamples: municipalities
with and without responsive market demand for physician services. In mar-
kets where demand is responsive to physicians’ eﬀort, physicians must compete
for patients, and contract physicians have an incentive to provide more eﬀort
than otherwise. Wage physicians, on the other hand, have ﬁxed salaries and
no incentives to provide extra eﬀort. In municipalities with responsive market
demand for physician services, we expect patients to be less satisﬁed when the
wage physician density is higher. In municipalities having nonresponsive mar-
ket demand, there are no reasons why patients should be less satisﬁed if the
wage physician density is higher. In these municipalities, we expect patients to
look for the physicians with the shortest waiting time. Hence, in equilibrium,
all patients should have the same waiting time irrespective of the way their
physician is paid. Note that this is in accordance with the descriptive statistics
in Table 2, where we saw that the average satisfaction level was lower in mu-
nicipalities with nonresponsive market demand, especially for satisfaction with
general access with physician services.
[Table 3 about here]
In the analysis, we represent physician supply as the total number of physi-
cians per 10 000 inhabitants, the number of wage physicians per 10 000 inhabi-
tants and, ﬁnally, the number of junior physicians per 10 000 inhabitants. As an
alternative speciﬁcation, we tried to use the proportion of wage physicians (the
16number of wage physicians divided by the total number of physicians) instead
of the number of wage physicians. Since the results seemed to be less reliable
using this speciﬁcation (for example, a negative eﬀect of physician density in
several models), we chose to focus on physician densities.
The parameter estimates for the full sample are presented in Table 3. Fo-
cusing ﬁrst on the individual characteristics, we notice that on all dimensions
of physician satisfaction, males are less satisﬁed than females, and married peo-
ple are more satisﬁed than unmarried ones. There is also a clear tendency for
the satisfaction level to increase with age and to decrease with education and
family income. Turning to the eﬀect of physician density, we ﬁnd a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on general satisfaction, general access, information and
professional skills. A high wage physician density is negatively associated with
general satisfaction, waiting time and professional skills. As expected, a high
density of junior physicians seems to have a negative eﬀect on all aspects of
reported satisfaction.
A possible problem with this analysis is that market conditions are quite
diﬀerent among the municipalities in the sample. We therefore estimate the
same ordered probit models as above on the two subsamples: municipalities
with and without responsive market demand for physician services. The results
are shown in Table 4 (only the results regarding supply of physicians are shown;
other results are available from the authors). Except for a negative eﬀect of wage
physician density on professional skills, we ﬁnd no eﬀects of the wage physician
density on reported patient satisfaction in municipalities with nonresponsive
17market demand. The total physician density has a positive eﬀect on patient
satisfaction on all dimensions except waiting time and outcome, while the junior
physician density has a negative eﬀect on all dimensions except waiting time.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The results for municipalities with responsive market demand are shown in
the lower part of Table 4. In these municipalities, we ﬁnd a negative association
between wage physician density and three of the dimensions of patient satisfac-
tion (general satisfaction, general access, waiting time). That is, patients are
more satisﬁed in municipalities with a higher density of contract physicians. Our
interpretation of this result is that there is a shortage of patients in these mu-
nicipalities such that a possible demand response exists. Contract physicians
thus exert more eﬀort to attract more patients, and this (extra) eﬀort raises
patients’ beneﬁts from receiving treatment.
We conclude this section by noting that it might be the case that physicians
on performance contracts increase eﬀort at the cost of quality; for example,
fee-for-service physicians might provide shorter consultations and pay less at-
tention to their patients. If this were the case, we would expect patients to be
more satisﬁed with wage physicians than contract physicians on dimensions like
information, professional skills and outcome. However, such a hypothesis ﬁnds
very limited support in our results.
186C o n c l u s i o n
The purpose of this paper is to test whether a demand response by patients
exists in the Norwegian primary care sector. The Norwegian case oﬀers a unique
opportunity to explore this issue since primary care physicians are remunerated
in two diﬀerent ways: either by salary or by an incentive contract. Furthermore,
we have access to a large data survey that allows us to study the relationship
between consumer satisfaction with primary physician services and the way
physicians are paid. Since we expect that the patient’s beneﬁt is higher the more
eﬀort the physician puts into the production of health for the patient, we infer
that patients who visit a contract physician are more satisﬁed. This inference
is, however, only valid if contract physicians gain from exerting extra (costly)
eﬀort. This is the case if there is a shortage of patients. We therefore split
our sample and estimate diﬀerent models for municipalities with and without
responsive market demand for physician services.
As expected, we ﬁnd no eﬀects of the wage physician density on reported
patient satisfaction in municipalities without a responsive market demand. In
municipalities where market demand is responsive, we ﬁnd a negative association
between wage physician density and patients’ satisfaction with their physician.
Our interpretation of this result is that contract physicians exert more eﬀort to
attract patients when a demand response exists, and this (extra) eﬀort raises
patients’ beneﬁts from receiving treatment.
The fact that a demand response by patients can mitigate the eﬀects of moral
hazards is well known in the literature (see, e.g., Ma, 1994; Ma and McGuire,
191997; Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998). In a recent paper, Chalkley and Khalil
(2005) show theoretically that demand eﬀects also help to align incentives by
reducing provider rent due to asymmetric information. More precisely, they
compare payments based on treatment (input measures) and payments based on
health outcomes (improvement in health status). Their main result is that when
demand is responsive to quality of care, payment schemes based on outcome
reduces the overall cost to the purchaser relative to payment schemes based on
treatment. The mechanism is simply that it is more costly to a physician to
misrepresent one type of patient as a diﬀerent type of patient when services have
to be tailored to patient type such that the outcome is consistent with what is
claimed, and patients are responsive to the type of services with which they are
provided. What we show is that a demand response exists in primary care. One
challenge for future work is therefore to consider how payment systems that are
in accordance with recent theoretical work can be implemented in the health
care sector.
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Salaried physicians  Contract physicians 
Responsive to physicians 
effort  No incentives  Positive incentives 
Non-responsive to physicians 
effort  No incentives  No incentives 
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Table 1. Variable descriptions. 
Dependent variables  How satisfied are you with:  
General satisfaction  The primary care physician 
General access  The access to physicians in the municipality 
Waiting time  Waiting time to get an appointment 
Professional skills  The physician’s professional skills 
Outcome  The outcome of the treatment 
Communication  Information about diagnoses and treatment 
  
Independent variables:   
Municipality characteristics   
Physicians  Number of physicians per 10000 inhabitants (in 
person years) 
Wage physicians  Number of employed physicians per 10000 
inhabitants (in person years) 
Junior physicians  Number of junior physicians per 10000 inhabitants (in 
person years) 
Vacant physicians  Number of vacant physicians per 10000 inhabitants 
(in person years) 
  
Total employment  Number of other personnel in primary health care (in 
person years) 
Hospital  1 if there is a hospital in the municipality 
Hospitalization  Mean length of stay in hospital 
Mortality  Number of deaths per 1000 inhabitants 
Health expenses  Total public expenses on primary health care 
Population  Number of inhabitants 
Individual characteristics   
Age Respondent’s  age 
Male 1  if  male 
Married 1  if  married 
Education 1  1 if high school 
Education 2  1 if college or university 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics. 






with a responsive 
market demand 
Dependent variables     
General satisfaction  4.60 (1.23)  4.53 (1.27)  4.63 (1.22) 
General access  3.82 (1.35)  3.62 (1.36)  3.90 (1.34) 
Waiting time  3.70 (1.58)  3.63 (1.60)  3.73 (1.57) 
Friendliness  4.62 (1.18)  4.55 (1.18)  4.65 (1.17) 
Professional skills  4.91 (1.01)  4.86 (1.03)  4.94 (1.00) 
Outcome  4.66 (1.20)  4.61 (1.23)  4.69 (1.18) 
Communication  4.75 (1.19)  4.71 (1.21)  4.77 (1.18) 
Independent variables     
Municipality 
characteristics: 
   
Physicians  7.83 (1.26)  7.71 (1.22)  7.88 (1.28) 
Wage physicians  1.04 (1.28)  1.20 (1.08)  0.97 (1.35) 
Junior physicians  0.23 (0.62)  0.25 (0.86)  0.22 (0.48) 
Vacant physicians  0.22 (0.51)  0.67 (0.76)  0.02 (0.07) 
Total employment  15.87 (3.26)  15.46 (3.63)  16.06 (3.07) 
Hospital  0.62 (0.49)  0.69 (0.46)  0.59 (0.49) 
Hospitalization  2.07 (0.43)  1.90 (0.44)  2.14 (0.41) 
Mortality  9.51 (1.93)  8.85 (1.86)  9.80 (1.89) 
Health expenses  1.18 (0.53)  1.08 (0.21)  1.22 (0.62) 
Population  7.52 (11.90)  7.74 (6.08)  7.43 (13.66) 
Individual 
characteristics: 
   
Age  47.36 (17.42)  45.60 (16.74)  48.12 (17.65) 
Male  0.47 (0.49)  0.46 (0.50)  0.47 (0.50) 
Married  0.62 (0.49)  0.59 (0.49)  0.63 (0.48) 
Education 1  0.46 (0.50)  0.43 (0.49)  0.48 (0.50) 
Education 2  0.35 (0.48)  0.42 (0.50)  0.32 (0.47) 
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Table 3. Ordered probit model on patient satisfaction, full sample.  
 











































































































































































































































































Observations  12323 12043 12182 12080 11603 11630 
Log likelihood  -18152.18  -19375.24  -20992.41 -17274.78 -15030.15 -17002.49 
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Table 4. Ordered probit models on patient satisfaction.  
 
Municipalities without a responsive market demand. 















































Observations  3730 3595 3665 3624 3519 3496 
Log  likelihood  -5605.44 -5863.32 -6370.78 -5224.94 -4641.36 -5187.09 
 
Municipalities with a responsive market demand. 
 

















































Observations  8593 8448 8517 8456 8084 8134 
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